Events of the Sventsyansky breakthrough in 1915 and the actions of the cavalry
https://doi.org/10.21285/2415-8739-2023-1-157-166
Abstract
The article is devoted to a significant episode of the 1915 campaign on the Russian front of the First World War - the actions of the Russian and German cavalry during the Sventsyansky breakthrough. The Sventsyansky breakthrough became an important stage in the Vilna strategic operation in August-September 1915. From an operational point of view, the Vilna operation serves as a classic example of the correct use of cavalry by the German command. In fact, these events represent the climax in the development of German military doctrine on the use of cavalry. But the success remained operational, and did not develop into a strategic one. Strategic success went to the Russian command. And this is the fault of the command of the German Eastern Front, which failed to calculate the parameters of the operation and provide support for the cavalry that had broken through. The Russian cavalry, despite its significant numbers, did not give decisive successes. Despite its excellent quality, it could not correct the mistakes made by the high command, which failed to properly use their mobile forces. The main reasons for this should be sought in the inability to control the actions of the strategic cavalry. And at the heart of this is the lack of understanding by the high combined arms command of the characteristics of the cavalry, the lack of an assessment of its decisive moral and physical impact on the rear of the enemy, and clear rules for the use of large cavalry masses. The cavalry, receiving several tasks at once, sprayed their strength and attention. Having got involved in battles with infantry, the Russian cavalry was late for the pursuit. As a result, the moment when the rapid appearance of a strong Russian cavalry in the immediate rear of the retreating Germans could turn a relatively orderly withdrawal into a disaster was missed. All this was a consequence of the lack of a doctrine of the use of strategic cavalry, which significantly affected the results of the operation.
About the Author
A. V. Oleynikov
Astrakhan State Technical University;
Astrakhan State University
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Alexey V. Oleynikov, Dr. Sci (History), Associate Professor, Professor of the Department of Law; Professor of the Department of History of Russia
16, Tatischev St., Astrakhan 414025;
20A, Tatischev St., Astrakhan 414056
References
1. Batorskii M. (1925) Service of the cavalry. Moscow. 303 p. (In Russ.).
2. (1916) Great War. 1915. Essay on major operations. Russian Western Front. Petrograd: Izdanie B.A. Suvorina. 61 p. (In Russ.).
3. Noskov A.A., Veshchii (1916) Vilna-Molodechno operation. August - September 1915. Petrograd: Izdanie B.A. Suvorina. 15 p. (In Russ.).
4. Gr. A.D. (1917) Horse attacks under modern combat conditions. Voennyi sbornik = Military Collection. No. 5. P. 1- 20. (In Russ.).
5. Danilov Yu.N. (1924) Russia in the World War 1914– 1915. Berlin: “Word”. 411 p. (In Russ.).
6. Zaionchkovskii A.M. (1929) World War. The maneuverable period of 1914-1915 in the Russian (European) theater. Moscow - Leningrad: Gosizdat. 415 p. (In Russ.).
7. Evseev N.F. (1936) Sventsyansky breakthrough 1915: military operations on the Eastern Front of the World War in September - October 1915. Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe voennoe izdatel'stvo. 268 p. (In Russ.).
8. Keller F.A. (1910) Several cavalry issues. St. Petersburg. Iss. 1. 30 p.; Iss. 2. 42 p.; Iss. 3. 40 p. (In Russ.).
9. Kersnovskii A.A. (1994) History of the Russian Army. Moscow: “Voice”. Vol. 3. 368 p. (In Russ.).
10. Kovalev E. (1961) Don batteries in the Sventsyansky breakthrough. Voennaya byl' = Military true story. No. 48. P. 8-10; No. 49. P. 1- 4. (In Russ.).
11. Mozer O. fon. (1923) A Brief Strategic Review of the World War 1914–1918. Moscow: Supreme Military Editorial Council. 175 p. (In Russ.).
12. Novikov P.A., Karkotko A.Yu. (2017) Maneuver of Russian troops during the liquidation of the Sventsyansky breakthrough in 1915. Izvestiya Laboratorii drevnikh tekhnologii = Journal of Ancient Technology Laboratory. Vol. 13. No. 4. P. 145-153. (In Russ.).
13. Oleinikov A.V. (2022) «The situation in Vilna is very difficult. The Russians are coming...» Vilna strategic operation and stabilization of the Russian front of the First World War. Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal = Military History Journal. No. 6. P. 58-71. (In Russ.).
14. Pevnev A. (1929) Cavalry in the Sventsyansky breakthrough. Voina i revolyutsiya = War and Revolution. Book. 12. P. 74-92. (In Russ.).
15. Perepelovskii K. (1971) The role and significance of the Russian front in the War of 1914- 1917 according to foreign military sources. Voennaya byl' = Military Story. No. 111. P. 7- 12; No. 112. P. 1-6. (In Russ.).
16. Ritter Kh. (1923) Criticism of the World War: legacy of Count Moltke and Schlieffen in the World War. Petrograd: Military Publishing House of the Petrograd Military District. 221 p. (In Russ.).
17. Neznamov A. (1922) Strategic outline of the War 1914– 1918. Moscow: Supreme Military Editorial Council. Pt. 4. 133 p. (In Russ.).
18. Syromyatnikov A. (1927) Actions at the joints. Moscow - Leningrad: Gosizdat. 131 p. (In Russ.).
19. Talenskii N.A. (1944) The First World War 1914-1918. (Combat operations on land and at sea). Moscow: OGIZGospolitizdat. 126 p. (In Russ.).
20. Histories of Two Hundred and Fifty-One Divisions of the German Army which participated in the War (1914-1918). Washington, 1920. 748 р.
Review
Views:
96
Email this article 